When News Corporation took over Dow Jones two years ago, it was quick to move out key senior Dow Jones managers and move in its own team that had a vision for how to make the brand a profitable and thriving outlet for business news and information. At that time I said on ContentBlogger, "The opportunity is for News Corp to enable a more aggressive melding of enterprise and media services as the differences between today's business media outlets and today's enterprise portals begin to narrow." I also speculated at the time whether Dow Jones Enterprise Media head Clare Hart would stick around to become a player in this mix or move on, suggesting that at least for a time she was respected enough that it was worth her hanging in there.

Labels: B2b media, Business Information, clare hart, consumer, Dow Jones, enterprise, Factiva, News Corp, NewsCorp, Wall Street Journal

There's the usual spate of moans and groans about print profits coming out of the Argyle Executive Forum on Leadership in Media, according to Red Herring, which featured insights from many key figures in today's news media markets. This negative outlook is underscored by News Corp's withdrawal from bidding for New York area newspaper Newsday based on it being "uneconomical" and setting the stage for a potential takeover of the paper by Cablevision. While revenues continue to climb from online content at news outlets classified revenues are still highly vulnerable from online competitors, making it hard to translate growing online audiences into profiles that resemble print.

There's not much new in all of this, to be sure, but I was interested in the following comment from the Argyle conference:

Norman Pearlstine of the Carlyle Group told attendees that newspapers enjoyed a brief period of monopoly that attracted investors and convinced many families to take their businesses public. However, he said, for most of its history, the newspaper business did not enjoy the double-digit margins that characterized the 1980s and 1990s. “At the end of the 19th century there were 29 newspapers in Chicago,” he said.

In other words at the end of the day perhaps the consolidation in the print industry of the past fifty years or so, first in response to rising fixed labor costs and television competition and then from the Web, created an illusion that highly capitalized media operations would yield superior results in an industry that has historically favored diversity in lower-margin operations. By creating larger swaths of exclusivity for fewer brands in major markets, newspapers and other print outlets were able to attract advertisers for several decades and provide reach at the same level of television markets. But in doing so they never really addressed the lack of technologies that could deliver higher margins except through higher production volume. This created an artificial illusion of technology scarcity that helped to drive both margins and the expectations of people creating print content. As long as there was a steady stream of companies to acquire to build up the illusion of scarcity, this worked rather well. But we seem to have come to the end of the run of worthwhile mass market print acquisitions. Big will probably get bigger yet if government regulations allow it, but to far less avail.

By contrast, the Red Herring article highlights how Playboy Magazine was one of the very first to invest heavily in Web technologies and to learn how to make them both profitable and attractive to advertisers and audiences, including heavy investments in online video and multiplatform delivery. The result: a highly profitable and attractive operation that offers some unique appeal to online audiences based on both content and branding. Instead of focusing on acquisitions in a sea of abundant competitors to create more artificial scarcity, Playboy worked to create something more appealing what would create quality that would be hard to replace.

Another important contrast comes from a recent MediaPost article, in which Ken Doctor points out that local newspapers are still doing fairly well, in part because many local advertisers as well as audiences have yet to be able to leverage a confusing array of online options effectively. This creates a real scarcity of audiences focused on local online content that are easy for advertisers to attract with some scale. Online alternatives are catching up fairly quickly in terms of content quality, but until GPS-enabled advertising services grow more sophisticated local print will continue to offer a ray of hope for print.

The bottom line is that it's far from clear that major media outlets as we know them really need to exist as they have for the past fifty or so years much longer. If the historical state of content is a wide variety of focused outlets with relatively low revenues, low volumes and low margins, then maybe what online publishing is beginning to usher in is simply the return of publishing to its more normal state. The difference with current markets is that electronic content aggregation makes it relatively easy for a wide variety of publications to leverage common technology. For example, individual weblogs such as ours use a tiny fraction of the power found in Google's Blogger.com infrastructure. So by focusing their capital mostly on pure infrastructure, Google has created true scarcity of highly scalable publishing capabilities that can service both localized and broad audiences very effectively.

Notably even companies like Google go out and buy market share through acquisitions - online video outlet Blinkx is rumored to be on their short list of short-term possible acquistions -
but these tend to be acquisitions that bring in both unique technologies and unique audiences. Where major media companies look mostly at reducing costs through online and print publication consolidation, the Googles of the world stay focused on creating more unique product value through acquisitions. With such an insistence on sticking with old metrics for performance it's not clear that established media companies can commit their capital effectively to gain a market advantage as long as they continue to focus on creating more artificial scarcity for dated products and dated delivery technologies. In the meantime private equity abounds to fund technology platforms that will take away the best opportunities for a wide variety of producers content with higher margins on lower volume and advertisers pleased with more focused audiences.

In other words, it's very unclear where the news industry goes from this point if they don't want to invest far more heavily in new electronic product development for more focused audiences. With a sour economy making it all the more hard to raise more capital for investment, expect media titans to continue to wrestle with their place in a content market traditionally dominated by smaller, more agile and more innovative players.

Labels: media, Monetization, News, News Corp, newspapers, print

In war it's said sometimes that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. If business deals are a form of warfare then we're seeing some interesting friendships in Silicon Valley these days. The Wall Street Journal covers an emerging wrinkle in the battle for Yahoo as they march closer to a deal to replace their ad network with ads from Google's more powerful stock of advertisers. WSJ speculates that this will make it harder for regulators to approve other acquisition offers from Microsoft and News Corporation to take over Yahoo - or at least slow down a potential re-upping of a bid from them. That may be the case, but it seems as if step by step Yahoo is navigating to a peaceful conclusion to its current woes - and forming a more healthy revenue picture that could help it to define a more comfortable independent future.

With the USD billion -plus boost it's likely to receive from Google's ad networks for ads displayed on its search pages and other page inventory and a potential pickup of already Google-friendly AOL, we're beginning to see the outlines of a duopoly to counterbalance the strong push of Microsoft and News Corp to dominate online media. In broad terms, think of Google as the search, video, database/API and ad backbone for the commercial Web and Yahoo as the media licensing, aggregation and community backbone. Each of these specific domains will overlap, of course, but in broad terms there's a symbiosis between them that offers each a path to revenue growth and the industry as a whole two distinct partners with two distinct strength sets.

This is probably the way that it should have been a while ago. I don't think that there was ever really a strong rivalry in many ways between Yahoo and Google on the product level. Each has always had their specific strengths, and probably both would have benefited greatly for earlier cooperation of this kind. Google was never going to "do media" as well as Yahoo and Yahoo was never going to "do technology" with quite the intensity and neutrality as Google. But between the two of them they both do online content very well indeed. And between the two of them they will have oodles of page inventory for ads to help them weather tougher economic times with fewer concerns - hopefully a key factor that can appeal to Yahoo shareholders being faced with choices.

More to the point, perhaps, such a duopoly would restore some natural balance to the Web that would enable marketers and publishers to understand who to deal with more effectively. There have been too many players with designs to be a "new number one," too much time wasted on kingmaking and not enough time spent on product development. It still leaves Microsoft plenty of room to focus on new and better platforms for content with mobile operators, auto manufacturers and appliance makers and to try to lock up entertainment deals for those platforms. News Corp may prove to be a stepchild in this situation for the moment, but with MySpace still chugging along healthily I doubt that it will be out of the game in any long-term sense.

The key loser in this deal would seem to be not so much Microsoft as Microsoft's strategy of domination by selling intellectual property. Be it software or content, Microsoft's continuing focus on proprietary consumer goods and services is distinct in many ways from the more open and collaborative assembly of value found in many Web-oriented environments. This may work to Microsoft's advantage where they can provide new and powerful platforms for content, such as in their Sync line of automobile communications technologies, but with ownership of content being more at the mercy of companies that own contexts it tends to be a strategy that conflicts with successful online media. It's that conflict that seems to be at the heart of their failure to convince Yahoo that a marriage would be good. At its heart, after more than a decade of online development, Microsoft still doesn't "get" the Web in some fundamental ways - nor does it seem to want to.

I'd be very happy if this path towards collaborative independence for Yahoo works out the way that it's headed currently. None of the acquisition paths for Yahoo were looking very positive for either Yahoo or the industry as a whole, even if they would have been good portfolio matches for potential stockholders. Here's hoping that we can let this deal fracas die off so that we can get back to focusing on the growth of the Web's greatest strengths - great content and powerful contexts.

Labels: AOL, Deals Partnerships and Sales, Google, Microsoft, News Corp, Yahoo

One of the more interesting things about coming back to blogging after a short hiatus is that the Yahoo deal drama has only gotten worse. There's great coverage from many sources, including a good summary of recent analyst takes on paidContent.org, as well as a New York Times story now circulating that News Corp may combine with Microsoft to complete a deal for Yahoo, presumably to combine MySpace's social media strengths with MSN and Yahoo's strengths along with a combined ad network. The counterfoil to this is a possible deal to merge AOL into Yahoo.

Certainly an AOL/Yahoo merger would help Time Warner's plan to get out of the portal business and help Yahoo to grow market share significantly - and certainly working towards one set of user accounts, one messaging network and other combined infrastructure could become very valuable over time. But one wonders how much time and effort would be spent on merging plumbing on these two legacy platforms to get a unified portal business when they could have been focusing on the growth in traffic comes from social media products that operate largely via other platforms.

By contrast the Microsoft/NewsCorp/Yahoo combination may offer a lot more punch for a shareholder's money. Leveraging the power of MySpace, a still-powerful social media platform well-attuned to mass media markets with Yahoo's strength in content aggregation and user accounts and Microsoft's strength in software development, platform strength and ad network brokerage, all in one package, has a lot of interesting parts that could produce more value in the long run. AOL and Yahoo combined, for example, will do little to penetrate mobile markets more effectively. Yahoo, Microsoft and MySpace, by contrast, could make some interesting things happen in mobile between platforms, social media, user accounts and ecommerce.

This is all well and good, but why are we so fixated on this deal, anyway? It's not that it won't create some sea changes over time, but the strengths of a deal with Yahoo come largely from what the partners may offer in combination. Yahoo is big, still powerful - but for the most part in its lifecycle a cash cow with relatively low new product investment waiting to be turned into hamburger. The real issue is what this means in terms of exit plans for online content and technology companies, as pointed out by Fred Wilson over on A VC - that is, if a company with fairly obvious marketable attributes like Yahoo has a hard time cashing in, what does this mean to online plays in general? If there's no exit at the top, what does that say to other players?

Somehow a deal will be forged for Yahoo in the next few months if the company's staff doesn't implode before then from takeover stress. But in the meantime I honestly don't think that it's all that significant a deal to watch from the overall industry's standpoint. Big will get a bit bigger - and that combined entity will still look nothing like Google. I think that we're seeing that overall getting any bigger is not necessarily going to solve anything in online markets. Online publishing is still in its infancy, still requires an enormous amount of investor patience as new ideas face daunting risks and still will have periods of high uncertainty that don't lend themselves to quarterly reports, much less private shareholder reviews. In other words, while some people are still focusing on making larger dinosaurs the long money is still probably in making more and better mammals. Be patient, be foresightful - and don't get too caught up in the scuttlebutt.

Labels: Deals Partnerships and Sales, Google, MSN, MySpace, News Corp, Yahoo

Were we surprised that Dow Jones CEO Richard Zannino will be stepping aside for News International executive chairman Les Hinton, key exec for New Corp's business and mainstream news operations?

Nope.

Was it any small surprise that Gordon Crovitz, President of Dow Jones Consumer Media and the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, would be leaving along with Zannino?

Hardly.

With a changing of the guard at the top of News Corp expected and Murdoch itchy to start transforming his new property to compete with other quickly moving global news outlets it only makes sense for Richard and Gordon to move on ASAP. This is of course no reflection on their ability to guide one of the world's premium business content brands into a highly profitable stance in the business media marketplace. This duo has to be credited with managing to maintain both an institution and a highly profitable and growing audience through some of the most challenging times in publishing history. But the new boss in town rivals New York Yankees baseball "Boss" George Steinbrenner for his fixation on goals and results. Lip service to tradition, yes, but hitting your mark comes first.

The goal: build the most sophisticated and recognized global brand of business news that can be wrapped around leading executives' decision-making processes in whatever context matters most to them and to monetize it in whatever way hits the bottom line best. Pride in subscription online portals and "the value of real journalism" be damned, it's the first to crack this converging marketplace that wins the gold. And Murdoch is not alone. With Reuters teaming up with The New York Times' International Herald Tribune to deliver business news in IHT's global daily news outlet and Bloomberg, LP choosing a media investments specialist for its top spot the marketplace for business media and information is shaping up to be increasingly complex. Add on The New York Times' stellar traffic growth since dropping its subscription firewall
and it's anyone's game to build a new dominant position in business news and information services.

The odd leg out in this discussion so far, though, is Dow Jones Enterprise Media, AKA Factiva plus the remnants of Dow Jones' enterprise feeds business. The opportunity is for News Corp to enable a more aggressive melding of enterprise and media services as the differences between today's business media outlets and today's enterprise portals begin to narrow. No word yet as to whether Clare Hart is expected to move on, but with relatively little expertise within News Corp in managing subscription business information database services she may wind up being a well-positioned player - that is, if some of the industry's other merging interests don't tantalize her more than playing NewsCorp Survivor. With an established global base of clients Factiva is likely to become an important fulcrum as NewsCorp tries to leverage its way further into global business information circles.

There's a lot yet to unfold in this fascinating merger, but already we can see that promises of journalistic integrity in Murdoch's world view are not synonymous with the status quo for journalists in any sense of the word. In may ways this may turn out to be a great plus, as Dow Jones journalists get to play out their careers in an increasingly sophisticated global marketplace. In the meantime it's time for U.S. business journalists of all stripes to recognize that as much as they have been biting the hand that's fed them pretty well all these recent years this hand has been mightily slow in creating better long-term career options for them. Certainly not everyone will be happy with these impending changes at Dow Jones and some "old guard" insight is surely going to be lost along with this increased global nimbleness but there's no time to waste if NewsCorp is to make the most of the Dow Jones family of content brands. In this landscape the purity of outdated methods can be no match for the purity of mastering new ones.

Labels: Bloomberg, Business Information, business media, Dow Jones, New York Times, News Corp, Reuters, Thomson

TechCrunch picked up over the Thanksgiving holiday on a rumor that Rupert Murdoch is pursuing the acquisition of the LinkedIn social network, a rumor later denied by News Corporation in The Telegraph but which has more than a grain of strategic sense in it nevertheless. [UPDATE: VentureBeat provides comfirmation with details that parallel our original post.] With Fox Interactive Media head Peter Levinsohn confessing in a Reuters interview that he finds Facebook "substantially more entertaining" than their own MySpace, there's an acknowledgement that MySpace is more about traditional media in many ways than it is about the multi-dimensional networking that Facebook enables for adults in professional and personal roles. While MySpace's upcoming personal feeds will no doubt give MySpace a little more boost against the rapidly growing strength of Facebook it's clear that Murdoch has many fish to fry when it comes to attracting adults who are at the core of many of his holdings' revenue streams.

A LinkedIn acquisition would help News Corp to fill in not only dwindling business-oriented classifieds revenues as more jobs and services are posted and found on social media networks but as well give them a well-established network of professionals that could become the focal point of hard-core business information services that bridge media and enterprise markets. It's not likely that Murdoch's Dow Jones division will come up with a social network on its own to compete with financial communities on Bloomberg and Reuters networks, but with LinkedIn they would have the ability to have a key tool to help professionals network and execute enterprise business well beyond investment bank trading floors. That's likely to bolster revenues as Factiva database subscription revenues face tough times in a softening economy.

To some degree this might also help to solve some of the question marks as to how best to leverage the highly valuable network of Wall Street Journal subscribers, many of whom no doubt are LinkedIn members as well. What better way to give this elite business publication a powerful business social network than to equip it with the most popular business networking tool available to date? It's doubtful that the WSJ crowd would ever take MySpace seriously as a social networking environment, no matter how much News Corp tries to re-engineer it, so why waste time building one from scratch as potential rivals gear up their own efforts for business-oriented social networking? All of a sudden the idea of premium content takes on a whole new meaning in this context that can transform the WSJ community into an elite social networking community. In the meantime LinkedIn infrastructure can be repurposed to give MySpace some more adult angles as well for younger people who are looking for a Facebook alternative.

There are realistic options for LinkedIn other than News Corp, but few that would be able to leverage all of LinkedIn's value to its maximum potential. It's a logical and potentially powerful marriage of social media via an organization that understands both media and enterprise content value fluently. Murdoch is one of the few old-line publishers who really understands that the value in publishing is already way beyond the inventory that any one newsroom can create. In an era in which user-defined context is king, consider LinkedIn a key acquisition plum that's likely to be pulled out by a major player like NewsCorp sooner rather than later.

Labels: Deals Partnerships and Sales, Dow Jones, LinkedIn, News Corp

Mercifully the carnival that has been the negotiations for News Corporation's acquisition of Dow Jones appears to have pulled out of town, with factions of the Bancroft family finally wrestled into line with the financial and managerial realities of the deal. One shudders to think as to whether any right-thinking corporation would have considered an acquisition of Dow Jones any time soon after these machinations, so from at least that perspective the shareholders of Dow Jones should consider themselves very lucky indeed. But now that the glow of the spotlight is beginning to die down from this fracas, what's really going to happen with Murdoch's new acquisition?

As we said more than two months ago the benefits of having a global media company as a parent that has strengths in markets where Dow Jones needs to become stronger are the key to the real value in this deal. Murdoch's desire to have a major U.S. gem like Dow Jones in his crown will be overshadowed ultimately by his use of Dow Jones as an international brand that will allow him to become a more dominant player in influencing world markets. This will be especially important in U.K. Asian and Australian markets, where the online expertise and editorial strengths of Dow Jones can be used to build an English language global business media brand more able to dominate regional brands and Pearson's struggling Financial Times.
But it's also likely that the Dow Jones brand will be able to find footholds in other markets over times with Murdoch's leverage.

The missing piece from this empire is a strong presence in real-time trading markets. But given the cutthroat nature of those technology-driven markets that are not easily adapted to the managerial strengths of the Dow Jones organization this may be an omission worth skipping for the time being. As financial markets split into highly automated trading venues and opportunities driven by high-end market analysis tools the opportunity for Dow Jones to make better use of its strengths is not likely to solidify for some time in the wake of Thomson's pending deal for Reuters. A conjectural bid for Bloomberg is not really even worth considering at this point, though in two years' time it might be a reasonable play for NewsCorp if Murdoch's focus on succession takes his portfolio into more diversified channels.

While there is doubtless a fair amount of sadness in some hearts at Dow Jones as a proudly American brand passes to offshore ownership it's also an opportunity to reflect on the need for American business media in general to become more adept at managing international footprints. A weak dollar makes this a difficult time to buy in to those markets, so the wave of international acquisitions of U.S. targets this year at favorable exchange rates makes it that much harder for U.S. B2B media companies to make progress in overseas markets. But times will change - if B2B media companies take on a Murdoch-like view of the world that goes beyond the local golf courses and into more international circles of power. In the meantime congratulations to everyone involved in the Dow Jones deal - I hope that you get a few days off to forget about it all.

Labels: Business Information, Deals Partnerships and Sales, Dow Jones, Murdoch, News Corp

Bloomberg News covers Stanford Group analyst Clayton Moran's claims that the seeming listlessness of Yahoo's management since Terry Semel's departure and sinking share prices are laying the groundwork for an inevitable and likely sale of Yahoo. Moran cites Microsoft as the likely bidder and beneficiary of online synergies that would boost both properties into a newly competitive position against rival Google. There are a lot of things that still argue for this combination - invigorated search technology and online office components from Microsoft, advertising know-how and effective destination content development from Yahoo - and a such sale is certainly not improbable. Yet I can't help thinking that this may be one of those "perfect" marriages that would go south far more quickly than people may imagine.

The main rub that I see is that both companies suffer from two similar maladies: weakening market mindshare for their brands and dysfunctional product development cultures. Microsoft has had a remarkable string of product introductions that have been flops, duds or near-misses, in spite of having a near lock on many key technologies. Its Internet Explorer browser, once the unchallenged ruler of online Web content consumption, now boasts only about 70 percent of the European marketplace, a problem only exacerbated by mobile content markets moving further away from Microsoft technologies. Yahoo has many comparatively healthy and innovative initiatives, but some of its most innovative properties such as Flickr, del.icio.us and Yahoo! Pipes are either standalone brands or initiatives that are relatively orphaned from the mainstream Yahoo offerings. The Semel legacy of traditional media development stalled the effective development and integration of social media, a strategic error that Yahoo is working hard to correct but nevertheless a legacy of poor market timing that Microsoft will do little to bolster.

Moreover a Yahoo acquisition will do little to help Microsoft penetrate the enterprise/prosumer space very effectively. Yahoo's withdrawal from enterprise services a few years back left the playing field open for Google, which is still at the foothills of enterprise content but building a steadily growing array of products and integration resources to build that base over time. On the consumer side the addition of Microsoft properties to Yahoo's ad base would be a strong plus, but not one that could not be offered by other parters as well with greater online growth potential.

Which brings us to the question: who would want to buy Yahoo? I think that it's far more likely that News Corp will see a Yahoo acquistion as a perfect complement to its holdings.Its online management team is both upbeat and highly experienced with social media via Fox Interactive Media's MySpace platform and would offer Yahoo a better chance to develop as a dominant media brand with a strengthened advertising base. Yahoo's strong online finance portal would complement potential content fed in from Dow Jones holdings should that deal close, a deal that would have already provided News Corp with good enterprise revenues and technology platforms. Yahoo entertainment offerings would complement MySpace nicely and its enormous base of user accounts would offer MySpace a shot in the arm as Facebook builds a stronger market share.

The only real question for a Yahoo sale is timing - and it's likely that Yahoo's nascent social media replacement for its less-than-booming 360 portal may be the timing telltale. If the introduction of this effort is not stunning or if management becomes discouraged in its early testing phases then it's highly likely that a deal will be executed fairly quickly one way or another. But don't be surprised if quiet talks are already in the works - no doubt awaiting News Corp's finalization of Dow Jones details before focusing on Yahoo. Other potential suitors such as TimeWarner could enter the picture (AOL round two? Probably not.) but few offer clear synergies. We'll see whether Microsoft has the gumption to pull the string on a Yahoo deal, but my guess is that they have their hands full with many core competitiveness issues already - and that News Corp will be able to define more profitable synergies and longer-term brand strength before Microsoft gets to pop the question.

Labels: Deals Partnerships and Sales, facebook, Microsoft, MySpace, News Corp, TimeWarner, Yahoo

Brightcove is one of many video distribution platforms that wrestles for attention in the media world, an effort made easier by the announcement of a deal with Fox Entertainment Group to provide them with a platform for their IPTV plans. Brightcove's portal has featured primarily user-generated content and community, but its technology can accomodate long-format entertainment programming as well. Will Fox use Brightcove technology exclusively for its mainstream programming or will it use Brightcove's platform to build up user-generated content communities around its own assets? Time will tell, but my guess is that Fox Interactive Media's experience with MySpace argues for Fox having a good dose of its own user-gen content in the mix alongside mainstream Fox programming feeding synergies into the MySpace platform.

The key point in this deal is that an OEM strategy seems to have paid off for Brightcove based on the strengths of its own portal strategy that allowed them to refine its functionality with live audiences and to continue to act as a test bed for ideas that can feed into their partner networks. OEMing can be tricky if clients can't visualize the potential outcomes of using a product tailored to their needs, especially when you're a young company trying to get attention in a crowded marketplace. Having in effect bootstrapped their OEM strategy with their own Web site Brightcove made it that much easier for a prospect like Fox to say yes.

Labels: brightcove, Deals Partnerships and Sales, News Corp, video

Two weeks ago when we covered the offer by Rupert Murdoch to have NewsCorp take over ownership of Dow Jones there was plenty of froth from the Bancrofts and some media pundits that this was a "no way" proposition, making us just a little nervous about our bullishness on the deal. Two weeks later the Bancroft family has issued their own press release independent of Dow Jones to indicate their intent to provide Dow Jones with new ownership and that they are willing to speak with News Corp as a potential suitor. Murdoch's patience and low-key approach seem to have brought him at least to a place at the table, if not one fully welcomed, as the Bancrofts seem to have concurred with our earlier conclusion that this is the right time to make a sale. While there is always the potential for a surprise bid from the wings it's probable that whatever solicitations the Bancrofts initiate for alternative offers will be more to provide emotional and intellectual backing to the very likely consummation of a deal with News Corp. Investor's Business Daily noted earlier regarding this deal the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu's writing that exercising patience often leads to victory in war. Perhaps the patience of both the Bancrofts and Murdoch are about to be rewarded with equal measure.

Labels: Bancrofts, Deals Partnerships and Sales, Dow Jones, Murdoch, News Corp

The Wall Street Journal reports on NewsCorp CEO Rupert Murdoch's attempts to have conversations with the Bancroft family and other majority shareholders of Dow Jones - efforts that seem to have been spurned so far in spite of promises of editorial independence and limited control over hiring and firing. The article cites a Bancroft family member who saw Murdoch's offer as "the usual stuff" (one wonders what other "usual stuff" has been offered to Dow Jones in recent months). It's understandable that a company with the heritage of Dow Jones would balk at an offer that looks more like a hunt for a trophy wife on the surface than a well-planned merger, but in the details of Murdoch's offer is plenty of evidence that there may be some strong vision at work here.

Specifically of interest is Murdoch's willingness to invest in political and global economic coverage that would make The Wall Street Journal a more attractive international journal of record for business-minded people. In an increasingly global economy Murdoch sees no doubt in Dow Jones the core of an editorial and production team that has the ability to muscle into a more pronounced global leadership role in business media through localized print and online content. WSJ's readership is broad but not broad enough to allow Dow Jones to invest in a major global push effectively. It would be hard to imagine someone other than Murdoch who would have the cash, the influence and the market presence that would allow Dow Jones' brands to thrive in international markets to the extent that his tutelage would allow.

It's understandable that a proudly American brand like Dow Jones would resist Murdoch's advances but the sad fact of the matter is that U.S.-based business media services aimed at mass markets are not going to thrive in the years ahead unless they're more effective on a global scale. U.S. markets for business information are becoming far more data-intensive than overseas markets thanks to both the U.S. regulatory environment and the automated trading capabilities fed by that data. The in-depth journalism that is the specialty of Dow Jones will be focused more effectively on more opaque markets where insights beyond the reach of fair disclosure are needed more urgently. Other offers that are beyond this "usual stuff" may come along at some point but one wonders whether Dow Jones will have the market leverage at such an undetermined point in time to leverage its brand's strength as effectively as it can today. They may not like the suitor but Murdoch is leading with a strong suit that should be considered with a hard-nosed look at the spreadsheets as well as with a journalist's gut.

Labels: Business Information, Deals Partnerships and Sales, Dow Jones, media, News Corp, Trends

CNET News and many majors go all apey over an announced distribution alliance between NBC Universal and News Corp. to provide full-length ad-supported and premium video content to media-friendly portals AOL, MSN and Yahoo. CNET and others hint at talks with Google about bringing this presumably rights-protected content into their YouTube video portal, but it sounds like speakerphone-ware at most for now. In general the whole effort sounds a little panicky and ill-formed, with partners confused about what's going to be free or not and no real details as to how this will all hang together. There are promises of user-generated content being in the mix but no sense as to how it would fit in with centrally produced video content.

At the end of the day it's probably going to be a step in the right direction for media companies to get more aggressive about building broader distribution of content with their own monetization built in to the packaging. But for all the talk about "ubiquitous" distribution it's a very limited initiative with scads of professionally-produced content well outside of the packaging schemes - including some of News Corp's and NBCU's flagship shows. It also increases the sites at which one can get content from these partners from two to a whopping...five. Wow. Bump it up to thirteen and we could fill up an old-timey television dial.

It's all a sadly inadequate response to user-generated distribution that doesn't begin to provide video the flexibility that will be required to respond to the user-generated media phenomenon. At most it's an acknowledgment that a significant portion of their audiences would be just as glad to receive programming over an Internet connection instead of a digital cable or broadcast service. This will be a plus as PCs become more integrated into home entertainment centers: why muck around with distribution deals with other partners when you can stream the programming that audiences want right to their PC/HDTV server. But a response to YouTube and other user-dominated distribution channels? Hardly.

Instead of circling the wagons of "friendlies" video producers need to face head-on the challenges of making user distribution of their content a plus rather than a frightening minus. The longer that they wait on this inevitable requirement the tighter their circle of wagons will be as the user "savages" develop increasingly flexible - and entertaining - alternatives to traditional video media. We'll see how this goes, but my bet is that in the short term it will be a fairly large ho-hum as users wait for the dust to settle around a less-than-spectacular service debut.

Labels: AOL, Microsoft, NBC Universal, News Corp, Trends, video, Yahoo, YouTube