 |
|
Insights and headlines from Shore analysts on trends in enterprise and media content markets.
|
|
|
| Monday, November 30, 2009 |

 When Google Scholar launched five years ago on the Web, its aggregation of freely available scientific literature and citations launched some sizable seismic activity in publishing circles. All of a sudden, content that had been aggregated only via expensive subscription database services was available for free and accessible as easily as any Web page. Five years later, Google Scholar has expanded to include most freely available academic research sources, as well as abstracts from subscription sources and public patent records and is an increasingly popular resource for researchers and students. However, major aggregators of scientific publications still remain successful, in large part because they continue to develop more sophisticated search and display applications and, well, because time has been on their side. Pressures from Open Access advocates who press for free access to scientific research and an increasing array of applications built using Google Scholar as a source have begun to open major cracks in the barriers to entry into scientific publishing markets, but the people in charge of enterprise purse strings did not use Google Scholar in their university days. So, in spite of budget cuts. the status quo remains largely intact for many scholarly publishers.
 With this in mind, some reasonable skepticism is probably in order as Google announces the launch of a new Google Scholar service that makes full text legal opinions and legal citations available for case documents from U.S. federal and state district, appellate and supreme courts. Public records are becoming more commonly available in general thanks to both Google and other publishers that see opportunities in generating value from public content, so this move should come as no major surprise to anyone. Yet this first major foray by Google into legal content is surprisingly strong - and may be the beneficiary of better timing than earlier Google Scholar product improvements. While legal publishers will rest soundly knowing that the search capabilities for legal documents in Google Scholar are limited to simple "white box" queries, they may not be so tranquil when they look at the results themselves. Documents are rich in links to legal references in the cited documents, a capability that has been for many years one of the key calling cards for legal databases.
 Things get even more interesting when you look at the citations tab that is available for each located legal document. Google Scholar offers you brief, in-context snippets of how a case was cited in key documents, as well as comprehensive listings of citations in court documents and documents related contextually to the selected document. While that's far from the full capabilities that a LexisNexis or Thomson West offer to their professional clients, it's pretty much pointed at the core of their database offerings, nevertheless.
The Above the Law blog has a good summary of analysis and reactions from both legal experts and publishers, but I think that the most salient point comes from Social Media Law Student, which points out that this freely available information is likely to become a "go-to" content source for students who may not have ready access to subscription-based content sources. Looking at the offerings coming to market from Lexis.com, though, which I walked through recently as a part of my SIIA CODiE judging for Best Aggregation Service, it's not as if LexisNexis isn't aware of this "digital native" culture gap, as they try to index both public documents and freely available Web content to make it more accessible to legal students and professionals.
The threat that Google Scholar's new legal content represents to established publishers, though, is the exposure of a huge body of public documents to applications builders and content services. Much as Google Books' scanned out-of-print library holdings have created a resource for ebook platforms from the likes of Sony and Barnes and Noble, this new initiative from Google opens up more cost-effective competition for legal services publishers who may want to attack legal markets from new and innovative angles using Google Scholar as a resource. Some of the innovators may be startup companies in the mold of Collexis, which leveraged publicly available scientific content to showcase their innovative content discovery tools. Others may be business information competitors in adjacent markets, who may see a way to pick off some of the "low-lying fruit" using core legal content maintained by Google.
None of these really add up to a significant challenge to either LexisNexis or Thomson West in the short run, but they will tend to hold down their margins as they lose some market share and lose leverage at the negotiating table at contract renewal time. What this does add up to, though, is a strong case to have professional-grade legal information services more integrated into a far wider array of business information sources to support enterprise decision-making on many levels. If digital natives will have increased access to well-integrated legal content, the high end of legal information markets will need more unique content and integration across a fuller range of business information sources to justify premium prices.
As I mentioned earlier on ContentBlogger, I do think that Reed Elsevier would be smart to consider selling LexisNexis at this time in anticipation of this likely consolidation - or, alternatively, expand its business information holdings to build a broader base of services for LexisNexis. I think that the former is more feasible than the latter given current market conditions, and would enable Reed Elsevier to cash in on the still-formidable value of LexisNexis before it begins to lose significant market growth potential. Thomson was able to spin off its print assets near the peak of their value before print publishing markets ran aground, a trick that Reed Elsevier was not as fortunate in managing in the sale of its Reed Business Information publishing assets. Google's new legal offerings are not a death knell for premium legal information services, but they are a canary in the coal mine for database services based on public legal records. We'll be watching this space carefully in the months ahead. Labels: case law, citations, Google, legal, LexisNexis, public records, Publishing, scholarly publishing, subscription, thomson reuters, thomson west, westlaw
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 11:18 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
2 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 |

 In a move that shocked many B2B media insiders - including Incisive Media CEO Tim Weller - global information provider Reed Elsevier has announced the resignation of their CEO Ian Smith, to be replaced by Erik Engstrom, CEO of their Elsevier division. While early speculation from FT's Alphaville blog depicted the management shift as " a proper executive-level knifing," more considered comments from industry analysts and insiders in The Independent seem to indicate that Smith was falling on his own sword in recognition of some major challenges not easily resolved by someone with limited media experience. Three key factors were arguing strongly for changes at Reed Elsevier sooner rather than later: the selloff of Reed Business Information assets had stalled, pre-tax profits were down 52 percent in half-year results and investors lacked confidence in both projected earnings and Smith's aggressive recapitalization efforts. With Smith's mentor Jan Hommen having departed from Reed Elsevier's board in January to head the ING bank, a graceful exit was probably in order.
For all of the corporate drama that this move has generated, it's easy to forget that Smith's move to float more stock to reduce debt and to fund Reed Elsevier for more aggressive organic growth was a very sound move, even if it is one that displeases investors in the short term. The real question is whether Engstrom will be up to the challenge of using that capital effectively in a struggling economy. Certainly Engstrom's Elsevier unit is the most effectively positioned business unit in the Reed Elsevier empire today, with deep and widely successful enterprise information products and a growing folio of academic and scientific publications. Yet as relatively strong as Elsevier may be, growth will be a major challenge for Reed Elsevier, even if the economy is laid aside as a contributing factor.
The key problem that Engstrom faces is that few of the tricks that have worked for Reed Elsevier in the past are likely to lead to growth in the future. B2B magazine publishers over-romanticized the likelihood of revenues from traditional channels in the face of massive changes in online information delivery and were therefore ill-prepared to adjust to cutbacks in events attendance and slimmer online ad revenues. At the same time growth by title acquisition, licensing and data integration was making for a relatively rosy top line for Elsevier and LexisNexis but failed to leave enough room in budgets after debt and development costs to fund new product development. Fairly aggressive staff and operations streamlining at LexisNexis have improved the outlook for their business information operations somewhat, but the overall forecast for both LexisNexis and Elsevier highlights modestly incremental product development.
On the surface the smart approach would seem to be to "Glocer-ize" operations at Reed Elsevier as rapidly as possible. Thomson Reuters CEO Tom Glocer moved rapidly in recent years to pare away redundancies and legacy products with limited upside and to focus operations on enhanced integration of enterprise content services across their holdings. Unfortunately there are far fewer synergies available between LexisNexis and Elsevier than those found in Thomson Reuters holdings, with the cultures of the two divisions still remaining miles apart, both literally and figuratively. With ever-broadening competition for the core content licensing services of LexisNexis, including more aggressive development of Dow Jones' enterprise information holdings, Reed Elsevier looks increasingly like a company with one fairly stable boat and three heavy anchors failing to find a bottom.
While speculation remains in the air about a possible move to merge Wolters Kluwer operations in to Reed Elsevier, the more probable short-term solution would seem to lie in disposing of some or all of LexisNexis as promptly as possible while its asking price is still worthy. One possible solution would be to spin off LexisNexis operations to Thomson Reuters or Dow Jones to bolster their competitive positions in legal and business information. Thomson Reuters would be a better strategic fit overall for a spinoff, especially if Thomson Reuters could flip back some or all of its scientific holdings to Reed Elsevier, but regulatory concerns about merging LexisNexis into Thomson West would probably make a wholesale spinoff to Thomson Reuters doubtful. A more probable resolution to overcome regulatory hurdles might lie in offering LexisNexis legal assets to Dow Jones and its news licensing assets to Thomson Reuters, which has lacked archives depth since returning its interest in Factiva to Dow Jones.
Whatever the specific solution may be, Reed Elsevier needs cash to focus on building up its scientific and medical assets for growth as rapidly as possible. Cheap financing as a means to grow stables of titles is off the menu for a while, thankfully, so Smith's forecast for organic growth requires an acceptance that it will have to come by focusing far more aggressively on its Elsevier division. Elsevier is not without its own challenges - scientific publishing faces strong pushback from corporate and academic libraries that find it increasingly hard to afford the full range of journals that most publishers offer - but both scientific research and applied sciences are markets still crying out for productivity gains that would warrant increased product investments. By contrast, productivity in legal markets are moving away from many of LexisNexis' core database strengths, which would benefit from more integration with other platforms.
There's always the possibility that Engstrom may decide to go for short-term gains and shuffle the Reed Elsevier portfolio just enough to tweak out a year or two of decent earnings. Here's hoping that he finds the courage to make some very tough decisions as to what is likely to provide the best returns for Reed Elsevier investors in both the short run and the long run. Moving on a sale of LexisNexis, by far the most attractive disposable asset available from Reed Elsevier, will enable them to take advantage of its value while it still has some attractiveness in the enterprise information marketplace. Without further integration of their information with financial market information and successful media operations, LexisNexis is not likely to contribute significantly to Reed Elsevier growth for some time to come. We'll see how Engstrom decides to cut his losses, but here's hoping that his moves help to strengthen both Reed Elsevier and enterprise information markets overall. Labels: business, Business Information, Deals Partnerships and Sales, Dow Jones, elsevier, engstrom, enterprise, legal, LexisNexis, management, reed elsevier, scientific, technical, thomson reuters
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 10:20 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
3 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Wednesday, October 14, 2009 |

 A recent press release from Autonomy hailed an IDC report that gave them the leading market share for the search and discovery technology market. While congratulations are no doubt in order for Autonomy, which has thrived as other major competitors have struggled to gain momentum in general enterprise search markets, there's a wrinkle to this boast that should give one pause to wonder. Sue Feldman's indicating in the report that Autonomy has a 14.4 percent share of the search and discovery market in 2008, which is certainly nothing to downplay but also not a crushing dominance of this market. In other words, even the world's dominant enterprise-oriented search technology provider is little more than a niche player.
This is in part because there really isn't "a" search technology marketplace in any strict sense of the term. That may sound strange at first, but it's certainly true that search as a content location tool can only measure its success against very specific needs. Each enterprise, each publisher and media outlet, each marketplace has specific needs for content that determine whether a particular technology has been well tuned to its needs. We can use tech terms such as precision and recall to define in general terms how effective a search technology may be in returning useful information, but if a technology can't deliver editorial value very specific to an enterprise, it's just a general tool that is rapidly and easily commoditized rather than a powerful content tool.
The importance of catering to very tailored content delivery needs was underscored in my mind by a recent chat with Craig Carpenter, Vice President of Marketing for Recommind, a company providing content categorization and discovery tools that are finding particular success in legal and corporate compliance markets. Recommind has focused its capabilities on supporting functions such as e-discovery processes that enable an organization to understand what documents relate to a particular legal matter in the early phases of assessing a case. Going through emails, word processing and other unstructured enterprise documents rapidly to determine which ones relate to key figures in a legal matter or or compliance issue is a good stress test for any search technology. With recent U.S. government rules encouraging the use of electronic tools to accelerate content discovery, Recommind is one of a few companies that are well positioned to both accelerate compliance with those expectations and to eliminate legal expenses associated with the discovery process.
Certainly companies like Autonomy may be competitive in such situations, but when companies such as Recommind are focused more deeply on the needs of specific market sectors, they become, in effect, like subscription enterprise information services, delivering highly relevant content rapidly and reliably. There are, in truth, fairly few ways to attack search from a technology standpoint, so the most profitable victories in enterprise search and discovery technologies tend to go to the companies that have technology that is highly tuned to the very specific needs of a given market or client. That doesn't necessarily make one technology better than another in attacking those problems, but oftentimes only better tuned and one step ahead of other technology providers. So the fact that a company like Recommind is down in the depths of tuning their technologies to legal discovery and corporate compliance can offer them better margins for solving more focused, high-value enterprise problems - often the same kinds of problems that many enterprise publishers are trying to solve.
I do think that companies like Recommind that have done the heavy lifting on difficult enterprise search problems in specific sectors or problem sets can turn out to be double threats in enterprise content markets. Not only do they get to solve higher-value problems that are easier to measure for ROI, they also get to redefine market opportunities into other adjacent markets that may be difficult for others to attack. For example, when you look at the technology issues behind legal discovery, corporate compliance and more general high-value enterprise problems such as records management and knowledge management, there's a lot of overlap with a whole different range of technology services providers. On the other side of the spectrum, being able to categorize and organize content for the legal sector very effectively also begins to nibble at the opportunities for subscription enterprise services such as Thomson West and LexisNexis, which are also focusing more on semantic content organization but not necessarily with the deep technology focus of niche players such as Recommind.
Of course, the opposite forces of two-sided competition from large rivals can push back at niche-oriented technology players, but in general today's markets seem to be favoring specific solutions that make specific pains go away quickly in enterprises, with more general solutions with bigger tickets and fuzzier ROI being strung out on longer sales cycles. I don't think that we'll be seeing many new players like Recommind entering enterprise markets any time soon, but I do think that those that were able to get launched and cash-positive in the past few years are going to be tough competitors in the two-prong fight for content and technology dominance in the enterprise. Individually they may not take up anything like a 14 percent share of search and discovery markets, but when you look at their ability to respond to the best revenue opportunities within those markets, you can pretty much forget about the pie as a whole and start looking for the plums inside the pie that matter most. Labels: autonomy, categorization, compliance, content technology, discovery, enterprise, legal, LexisNexis, recommind, search, thomson west
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 3:29 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
6 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Wednesday, April 30, 2008 |

 There's been quite a rumble in the publishing community in the wake of this week's ruling by the U.S. District Court in Arizona in favor of Pamela and Jeffery Howell, defendants against a lawsuit raised by the Atlantic Recording Corporation for their alleged role in copyright infringement. Atlantic, with RIAA backing, was seeking a summary judgment against the Howells claiming that they had put music files on the KaZaa file sharing service, and by doing so violated Atlantic's rights to distribution under copyright law. That word "distribution" turns out to have become the pivotal point in a key decision that puts copyright law in its true perspective. The key finding by U.S. District Judge Neil Wake is a simple but fairly profound observation. Wake notes that although statues and court precedents state clearly that a distribution of content is a publication, not all publications are distributions. Specific to file sharing, the defendants claim that they did not put any music in the KaZaa file folder designated for file sharing - and that the record company's claim that more than 4,000 files had been designated by them for download was due to a glitch in the KaZaa software that made their music files, present in a folder not designated for sharing, identifiable by others in the KaZaa network. So although these songs were made to look as if they were available for distribution by KaZaa, they were not by any intent of the defendants. The Howells also pointed out that their computer was accessible by others who could have made their files exposed to the KaZaa network. The judgment reasserts that copyright is really not about the right to make copies but rather about the right to distribute copies of protected works for use by others. Implicit in that position is that individuals or institutions making copies for purposes other than distribution are not subject to copyright law. In other words, if you're using copies for your own licensed purpose, you're not a distributor: distribution is when you willingly make a work available for distribution and it's actually distributed. In the instance of the Howells, the judge perceived that through whatever happenstance an index saying that copies were available for distribution was not the same as saying that any specific person was actually distributing copies. Though there is already a growing body of legal decisions that seem to be weighing against RIAA efforts to discourage individual consumers from copying content, the Howell decision is notable in that the judge went to particular pains to delve into the technological "hows" of file sharing as well as into legal precedents. In doing so, Judge Wake has challenged publishers pursuing such suits to recognize that the more that they go into these suits the more that they create a wide portfolio of rulings that begin to flesh out the full reality of electronic content use - a portfolio that over time has weakened rather than strengthened their claims to inhibit content copying. Put simply, the more that these suits continued, the more circumscribed their claims become and the more that their presumption of complete power over copying will weaken. Already many in the music industry have recognized that trying to inhibit copying per se is counterproductive, as it weakens their ability to build brand value with consumers swapping from one platform to another at will to consume content. If your customer gets a new mobile phone, do you really want to hassle digital rights management issues when they try to transfer their music files to the new phone or do you want them to still be able to love the artists that you have in your stable? Increasingly being able to sustain passion for a brand is winning out over the absolute right to prevent copying. Distribution enables a relationship with a content brand: once that relationship is established, the relationship becomes more marketable than the content itself over time. Music publishers are beginning to get a far stronger sense of building marketable relationships with audiences as the key to their future profits. Digital watermarking techniques are one key element of moving away from fortress-like content packaging and towards being able to understand the value of the relationships being formed with content as it moves from one context to another. If a CD is copied but nobody cares about it, that's probably a bigger problem in the long run than someone copying a CD and discovering that people care about it very much - and will give you opportunities for revenue that spring from that distribution. Managing copyright via asserting distribution rights is still a very key mechanism for enabling revenues, but the future is in recognizing that you're far better off in the long run taking advantage of free distribution to get content into the hands of people who are likely to be your most valuable customers. Once it's there, have your content packaging ready and able to start the value conversation. Labels: copyright, distribution, legal, RIAA, suit
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 10:55 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
1 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Friday, October 12, 2007 |

 The Associated Press' position in the news world is in some ways stronger than ever, building on both traditional newspaper portals and the growth of online-only news venues such as Yahoo, Google and social news outlets. But it's also a challenge for AP and other wire services to define a path towards long-term growth as the variety of outlets that can generate and distribute news on the Web outside of their purview accelerates. An earlier lawsuit against Google for their use of news from AP on member sites yielded a settlement in AP's favor, so it's no surprise that AP is trying again with a new lawsuit against Moreover, Verisign's content mining service for media and enterprise clients. In the AP statement on the suit AP notes that AP discovered the extent of Moreover's practices while negotiating with it to provide content management services to the AP's members. Oops. The main bone of content seems to be that, like Google, Moreover is fairly efficient at harvesting news from AP from member sites for its clients, claiming that headlines could be appearing in Moreover within two minutes of their hitting a news Web site. This hits a little too close to AP clients who want to be the source for breaking news headlines. Adding to AP's perceived pain is Moreover's revenues gained from ad-supported and subscription services, including what AP claims is Moreover's use of story texts and photos. Cleverly the suit claims that Moreover's uses of headlines violate fair use laws by merely copying them instead of transforming them into a unique form and format. Given that fair use is used primarily for publications to use limited direct quotation of sources in news articles and other original works this seems like a stretch at best in relation to fair use law. By this definition any page of search results would be suspect, even though one could argue that each page of search results represents an original work of authorship through its organization of content into a unique compilation as proscribed under U.S. Copyright law. Search engine companies have been reluctant to test this concept in courts, however, as globally the interpretation could vary significantly. So this type of threat has been an effective tool for brining technology companies to the bargaining table for AP. Although AP's suit covers no apparent new legal ground it's use as a negotiating tool targeting a content harvesting company is an important new wrinkle. Although Web mining technology is in many ways little different than search engine crawlers its use to build applications beyond mere search results means that more value-add applications based on these technologies are becoming targets for copyright enforcement. It opens up many questions for both Web miners and providers of mashups and embedded content services. Services such as Sphere, which serve up embedded link references through its own crawling services, have become very popular with publishers trying to provide value-add content links to their sites, and these could become potential targets for AP-like lawsuits as well. Notably AP is targeting relatively mature businesses but with its use of the Attributor content tracking technology any service could become a target potentially. While AP may have some legitimate foundations to their concerns at the end of the day this is yet another company with distribution at the heart of their content business model struggling to understand how to position itself in a marketplace where distribution is in essence a free service. Like music publishing companies trying to position the value of their services for potential clients AP's aggressiveness in monitoring and pursuing potential copyright infringement provides them with a legal enforcement angle to their content licensing services that can help to justify premium prices for their services. But also like music publishers may come a point when the talent recognizes that they're pretty good at making money without distribution-oriented middle men. But AP is far smarter than music publishers in pursuing licensing deals through their surveillance efforts with companies that are likely to be able to pay in proportion to the commercial value of their services. Notably Moreover was an early entrant into content harvesting so its relatively mature base of enterprise and media clients gives AP a reasonable target to pursue that's more likely to settle on commercial terms than to go to the mattresses to defend matters on principle alone. In this sense AP is approaching situations like the Moreover suit as a rather aggressive business development effort - one that's not likely to endear AP content to the burgeoning embedding industry but one that may have some commercial effect for now but which may erode interest in AP as a business partner over time. In the meantime the stage is still wide open for virtual aggregation services that manage copyright issues effectively for both enterprise and media services to keep suits like AP's from becoming licensing nightmares. Labels: aggregation, AP, copyright, fair use, harvesting, legal, mining, Moreover, suit
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 5:38 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
2 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Thursday, July 05, 2007 |

 The announced USD 630 million deal for Incisive Media to acquire ALM is unquestionably the strongest acquisition move in the B2B media space in a year of largely aimless portfolio shuffling. Incisive is biting off a huge piece in the process of doing so - they have about USD 280 million in annual revenues - but this is far from your typical "let's balance the portfolio and combine content management systems" deal. In acquiring ALM Incisive walks away with one of the most effectively integrated range of legal publications for an industry vertical that has strong print revenues but also a remarkably strong and progressive online presence. In addition to ALM's wide range of traditional ad-supported editorial content they have been very active in integrating leading weblogs into their ad network and have gone way deep into their own vertical user-generated content via VerdictSearch, a portal that allows legal professionals to input details on cases and settlements into a database that can be searched or mined by ALM's editorial staff for hot legal stories. Toss on a strong relationship with Thomson West for enterprise integration and a strong events presence and you get a profile that most business information companies would have to work very hard to top. And that's before you get to the management team. Bill Pollak has assembled a top-notch staff at ALM to help it transition very profitably into the electronic age, holding out some promise that in the merger of these two companies it will be more than your typical "puff and slough" weed-out of mergee managers. Hopefully Incisive keeps much of ALM's team in place to help them assemble more effectively integrated marketing in vertical segments. Incisive's portfolio includes a wide range of titles largely aimed at financial markets that do very well online in many instances, but they have not leveraged new models of engagement for their audiences as effectively as ALM in many instances while some strong Incisive titles seem to be shoehorned in together rather oddly (do ClickZ and Search Engine Watch really belong in the same group as Inside Market Data?). Conquering both legal and financial markets in one portfolio is a very shrewd move, with the deal flow in these two segments oftentimes creating very complementary editorial and data flows. While the size of this deal may tie up Incisive's cash for a while it would be nice to think about how some further database acquisitions or alliances might help to create some very interesting synergies for dealmaking business information. But in the meantime there's also the complementary presence of Incisive's UK-oriented legal publications and other globally-oriented publications that will be strengthened by ALM's largely US-oriented marketing. While doubtless there will be some gnashing of the gears as new interests are merged and some cleaning out of questionable rabbit warrens this is a powerful move that draws into focus the increasingly merging worlds of legal and financial interests that will benefit from the combined coverage offered in these two teams. Hopefully this merger benefits the ALM team as much as it appears that it will benefit Incisive. Time will tell. Labels: ALM, Business Information, Deals Partnerships and Sales, incisive, legal
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 7:08 PM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
0 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
| Wednesday, March 14, 2007 |

 paidContent.org has a good summary of the meat of Viacom's new lawsuit against Google claiming that the thousands of video clips being posted to Google's YouTube service are violating the 1998 Digital Millenium Copyright Act. A good analysis by CNET of exactly what in the DMCA is germane in this suit points out that the thin ice that Google is treading upon is the alleged encouraging of mass infringement of copyright - in spite of very specific statements in its terms and conditions to the contrary. Financial analyst Henry Blodget notes in his blog that most of this is about heavy-handed deal-making and the ultimate failure of Google to come to terms with Viacom in recent discussions over content use and licensing. While the legal precedents are not strongly in favor of Viacom's view of this suit there are some important twists to consider. Though there is no user-driven revenue model for Google via YouTube as of yet it could be argued that Google is engaging in trade practices similar to what supermarkets have used oftentimes to penetrate new markets. In years past a chain wanting to dominate a given market would lower to cost of its goods to the point of losing money in that market's stores to force competitors to lose business - and eventually fold. Viacom's claim is in essence that Google set up a store and stocked stolen goods similar to their competitors and made them available at deep discounts - say, in this instance, for free. If this can be argued successfully in the courtroom Viacom has a leg to stand on. But this argument falls apart from a few angles. First, it's a little ironic that Viacom is claiming in a USD 1 billion suit that Google is using DMCA-sanctioned "takedown" of copyrighted content is a heavy-handed tool to buy them time in negotiating licensing deals. Other media companies have managed to come to commercial terms with Google for the use of copyrighted content on YouTube: what makes Google more "evil" in its relationships with Viacom? These precedent deals for YouTube usage can be used effectively in a suit as examples that Google does indeed want to license copyrighted content lawfully. Equally important is the question of whether Viacom has demonstrated that it has in fact tried to protect the value of its copyrighted content from duplication. If video clips are as easily "borrowed" by audiences as apples from an unattended fruit stand then the "stolen markets" issue is not easily argued - willful neglect could be argued fairly easily by the Google side. Had these clips been behind a firewall or in a DRM wrapper that Google had cracked directly, the DMCA angle on this suit would hold much more water. As it is, Viacom has no effective technology that prevents audiences from "borrowing" its online content. The real cloud hanging over this suit, though, is the pending legislation in the U.S. Congress to revise the DMCA to allow for more generous terms of use for copyrighted content by individuals. Viacom could in theory win its courtroom battle but find itself losing the war as new laws are passed making the laws far more in line with current practice via YouTube and other social media portals. It is this pending legislation as much as any real licensing issues that are probably behind Viacom's move to sue Google. After all, if you're going to have Congressional hearings on fair use as a part of that legislation, Viacom testifying to Congress as a major suit-bringer has a more serious heft to it. All of this boils down to one key factor: Viacom and many other media companies have given little or no thought as to how to make content automatically monetizable through social media services such as YouTube. Yes, Viacom, your copyright has been abused by some posters on YouTube, and yes, you shouldn't have to ask Google after the fact for documentation showing where content was in fact being abused, but why are companies like Viacom failing to implement tools and policies to help monetize their content more effectively? Consider Viacom's suit perhaps the last loud "bang" of anti-Google legal maneuvers - due in large part to Google's having anticipated the needs of video producers far more effectively than any other major content outlet. The case could break the other way but for today I'd bet on Google continuing its push towards video posting as it awaits reasonable action being taken by courts to validate its thinking about what makes a successful content play in today's New Aggregation. Labels: DMCA, Google, legal, Trends, Viacom
|
|
By John Blossom - posted at 2:01 AM |
permanent link to this entry
bookmark this entry:
|
|
|
|
1 comments (click to view or to add your own)
|
To top of page  |
|
|
|
 |
|